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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW-1954 TENNESSEE SURVEY
CLYDE L. BALL*
I. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Tort Liability: The case of Bricker v. Sims' was one of four cases
tried together involving the tort liability of a city and its officers. The
Board of Aldermen of the City of Martin adopted a curfew ordinance
prohibiting any person from being on a public street or other public
place after 11:00 o'clock at night. Plaintiff, while conducting himself
in an otherwise lawful manner, was arrested on the public streets of
Martin after the curfew hour; he was jailed and the next day was con-
victed and fined in the city court. Upon appeal to the circuit court
the case was dismissed at the cost of the city.
Plaintiff thereupon brought these suits against the city, the sheriff,
the mayor and the members of the board of aldermen for false arrest
and imprisonment, alleging that the ordinance was unconstitutional
and void. Upon demurrers, the cases proceeded upon the premise that
the ordinance was invalid. The cases thus raise three distinct ques-
tions: (1) Is a city liable for the acts of its agents, employees or
servants done in the performance of a governmental function? (2)
Is a member of a city legislative body civilly liable for his action in
voting for an unconstitutional measure? (3) Is a ministerial officer of
a city civilly liable for acts done in reliance upon an unconstitutional
ordinance? All three questions were answered in the negative.
In the absence of statute a city cannot be held liable under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior for acts of its agents or servants done in
the performance of a governmental function.2 The members of a legis-
lative body are not liable in a civil action for their act in voting for or
against particular legislation in the absence of corruption;3 the same
rule applies even where they exceed their authority in passing an in-
valid act.4 A ministerial officer is not liable for acts done in pursuance
of a duly enacted statute, even though the statute be unconstitutional.
An intolerable situation would result if each ministerial officer were
permitted to make his own decisions as to constitutionality; misfeas-
ance and nonfeasance in office would frequently be excused if the
*Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Faculty Editor, Van-
derbilt Law Review.
1. 195 Tenn. 361, 259 S.W.2d 661 (1953).
2. Connelly v. Nashville, 100 Tenn. 262, 46 S.W. 565 (1898); Davis v. Knox-
ville, 90 Tenn. 599, 18 S.W. 254 (1891). See 18 McQuILLIN, MUNICnAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 53.01 (3d ed. 1950); PROSSER, TORTS 1066 et seq. (1941); 38 Am. JuR.,
Municipal Corporations § 572 (1941).
3. See Note, Civil Responsibility of Member of Legislative Body for His
Vote Therein, 27 A.L.R. 125 (1923), and cases there cited.
4. See McGuire v. Carlyle, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 51 (1915).
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officer were allowed to apply his personal views as to the validity of
the laws purporting to govern his actions. Since he cannot so decide,
he is protected against civil liability for acting in reliance upon the
legislative acts.5
-Nature of the Function: In Watts v. Town of Dickson6 the Court of
Appeals held that maintaining and conducting a public water system
and selling water to the town's inhabitants is a proprietary, as dis-
tinguished from a governmental, function, and that therefore the town
was liable for its negligence in connection therewith. The court made
its decision on the basis of clear precedent 7 and made no attempt to
solve the problem analytically. The Tennessee courts repeatedly admit
that there is no clear definition or test which will determine the cate-
gory into which a particular activity belongs.
8
-Waiver of Governmental Immunity: In Scates v. Board of Comm'rs
of Union City a city automobile while being used by the city in the
exercise of a governmental function collided with an automobile be-
longing to Scates. Action by Scates against the city was barred by the
doctrine of governmental immunity. The city sued Scates, and he
then filed a cross-declaration for his damages on the theory that by
bringing the suit against him the city had submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court and had waived its immunity with respect to claims prop-
erly to be considered in such suit. The Supreme Court sustained a
demurrer to the cross-declaration. A private citizen may plead and
prove matters properly defensive, such as credits or set-off, in such a
suTit,' 0 but a cross-suit is not a defensive matter. Under Tennessee law
a municipality has no power to waive its sovereign immunity without
legislative authority. What it cannot do directly, it may not do by the
indirect method of instituting suit so as to open up a cross-suit. If the
legislature is sufficiently dissatisfied with this obviously unfair situa-
tion, it has the power to act to prevent its recurrence. Justice Tom-
linson and the Supreme Court are sound in their insistence that it is
up to the legislature and not to the court to abrogate a rule which has
its roots back far beyond the existence of the court.'
Duty to keep Streets in Safe Condition: City of Knoxville v. Cooper12
5. Roberts v. Roane County, 160 Tenn. 109, 23 S.W.2d 239 (1929).
6. 260 S.W.2d 206 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
7. Williams v. Town of Morristown, 32 Tenn. App. 274, 222 S.W.2d 607
(M.S. 1949).
8. See Vaughn v. City of Alcoa 194 Tenn. 449, 454, 251 S.W.2d 304 (1952);
Ball, Local Government Law-95i Tennessee Survey, 6 VAND. L. REV. 1206-08
(1953).
9. 265 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1954).
10. Moore v. Tate, 87 Tenn. 725, 11 S.W. 935 (1889).
11. For a recent discussion of the desirability of changing the rule, see
Anderson, Claims against States, 7 VAND. L. REV. 234 (1954).
12. 265 S.W.2d 893 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
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dealt with the extent of the duty which a city has to keep its streets
clear of obstructions. Plaintiff's intestate was killed when the motor-
cycle which he was riding struck a depressed area caused by uneven
settling of concrete slabs about a manhole cover. There was evidence
to the effect that the depression was not an unusual one, that it was
a normal occurrence in concrete pavements, and that others of like
nature existed in the city. Upon these facts the Court of Appeals found
no breach of duty on the part of the city. In reaching this result the
court quoted with approval language from two earlier Tennessee
cases 13 to the general effect that a municipality's duty requires it only
to remove dangerous obstructions which are calculated to produce
injury to persons using reasonable care and traveling in the ordinary
modes upon the streets. The obstruction must be one which would
probably result in injury under such circumstances in order to raise
a duty on the part of the city to remove it; the mere possibility of
injury gives rise to no duty to correct the defect.
Police Power-Regulation of Auction Sales: In Jones v. City of
Jackson 4 plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a city ordinance
which strictly regulated auction sales to be held within the city. The
effect of the original ordinance was to impose requirements which
would virtually eliminate merchandise auctions except for those held
under judicial order and those conducted by trustees, executors and
the like. The particular provisions of the ordinance are examined in
the article on Constitutional Law in this Survey.15 The court's decision
was to the effect that under the general police power a municipality
has the power to regulate a lawful business in a reasonable manner,
so long as the classification of the business to be regulated is not pal-
pably arbitrary. The court found that auction sales offer such an op-
portunity for fraud and deception that it is not unreasonable to classify
them as a business to be reasonably regulated in the public interest.
The court drew upon the many cases upholding jewelry auction or-
dinances and reasoned that furniture auctions can properly be placed
in the same category.
Enforcement of Municipal Ordinances: A court proceeding to enforce
a municipal ordinance, although it may appear to the defendant to be
criminal in nature, is really a penal civil action on the part of the
municipality, and is brought in the civil courts. Thus in Guidi v. City
of Memphis'l6 a prosecution for violating a city speed limit was civil
in nature. So, too, is a prosecution for possession of a federal wagering
13. City of Memphis v. McCrady, 174 Tenn. 162, 124 S.W.2d 248 (1938); For-
rester v. City of Nashville, 179 Tenn. 682, 169 S.W.2d 860 (1943).
14. 195 Tenn. 329, 259 S.W.2d 649 (1953).
15. Supra p. 779.
16. 263 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1953).
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stamp in violation of a city ordinance.17 And this is true even though
the offense described by the city ordinance is also a criminal offense
under the state law. Thus in Burns v. City of Nashville18 a city ordi-
nance prohibited the possession of gambling (lottery) tickets where
such possession violated state law, thus in effect incorporating in the
city ordinance the state criminal laws on the subject. Upon conviction
of illegal possession of gambling tickets in city court, the appeal went
to the Court of Appeals, rather than direct to the Supreme Court.
Zoning: City of Knoxville v. Brown 0 involved the construction of a
zoning ordinance in the City of Knoxville. Defendant resided in, an
area zoned "'A' One Family District." In such a district the zoning
ordinance provided that "no building or land shall be used... except
for one or more of the following uses: .... " Nine permissible uses,
all consistent with better class residential area, are then set out.
Defendant used the yard of his home as a site to assemble and dis-
assemble automobiles in pursuance of his hobby as a racing car driver.
At times he had as many as nine automobiles in his yard. He did no
work for others, and the automobiles were a true hobby rather than
a commercial enterprise. The circuit court reversed a judgment of
the Knoxville City Court finding defendant guilty of violating the
zoning ordinance. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the circuit
court. Justice Gailor dissented on the ground that a legitimate hobby
is a use customarily incident to a family residence, and that as the
zoning law is in derogation of the common law it should be strictly
construed and not extended by implication. It seems that when one
considers the purpose and policy back of zoning restrictions-the pre-
vention of nuisances and conflicts between adjacent landowners, the
avoidance of unsightly areas in residential neighborhoods-the con-
clusion of the majority is justified. Too, the prohibition of uses was
sweeping, and the ordinance could be given a strict construction
without permitting the use in question, as only the enumerated uses
were permissible. However, in arriving at the decision, it is respect-
fully submitted that Justice Burnett sought to make use of the doctrine
of ejusdem generis when that doctrine was wholly inapplicable. Jus-
tice Gailor made this point in his dissent: "That doctrine simply stated
is than in a contract or statute where a series of specific terms con-
cludes with a general term, that the general term shall, in its construc-
tion, be limited to the kind (genus) of the enumerated special terms.
There is no such language in the ordinance before us here. '20 Upon
Petition to Rehear Justice Burnett coupled the doctrine of ejusdem
generis with the maxim Expressio unius est exclusio alterius so as to
17. Deitch v. City of Chattanooga, 195 Tenn. 245, 258 S.W.2d 776 (1953).
18. 261 S.W.2d 149 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
19. 195 Tenn. 501, 260 S.W.2d 264 (1953).
20. Id. at 508-09.
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justify the application of the doctrine. However, the maxim seems no
more applicable than the doctrine. It requires no maxim or rule of
construction to conclude that the expression of the nine permissible
uses negatives any other use, since any other use is expressly pro-
hibited by the words of the ordinance. The whole question in the case
is whether the practice of an unusual hobby is permitted under the
use of the property as a one-family residence, where such hobby of-
fends the considerations which gave rise to the ordinance in the first
instance.
CoUNTMs
Exemption of Municipal Property from county taxation: Under the
Tennessee Constitution the legislature is empowered to exempt from
taxation property held by cities and used exclusively for public pur-
poses.21 Pursuant to this constitutional provision the legislature has
enacted a statute exempting from taxation property of any incor-
porated city in the state that is used exclusively for public or municipal
purposes. 22 In Johnson City v. Booth23 the facts were that Johnson
City had acquired some 1900 acres of land in Unicoi County as a water-
shed for springs and a creek from which the city obtained its water
supply, and including a tract of some 100 acres on which was built
a filtration plant covering about an acre. Water from this area was
piped through parts of three counties to reach the city. The unin-
corporated town of Unicoi was served by the water lines, as were
other areas immediately adjacent to the city limits. Unicoi County
sought to tax the land and the lines on the ground that only a small
portion of the land [that on which the water sources and filtration
plant were actually located] was being used for a public purpose. The
Court of Appeals upheld a declaratory decree holding that the prop-
erties were not taxable, except for the lines serving the Town of
Unicoi.
The providing of a safe and adequate water supply for citizens of a
municipality is a public purpose within the constitutional and statu-
tory meaning.24 This public purpose extends to the provision of a safe
and adequate supply of water to those unincorporated areas im-
mediately adjacent to the city limits, since epidemics or fires which
might begin in the immediate vicinity of a city could well affect the
health and safety of the inhabitants of the city.25 However, if the area
served by the water system is so far removed from the city as to ren-
der this purpose inoperative, to that extent the system is subject to
taxation. This seems to be the justification for the decree's excepting
21. TENN. CONST. Art. 2, § 28.
22. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1085 (1) (Williams 1934).
23. 261 S.W.2d 820 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
24. Smith v. City of Nashville, 88 Tenn. 464, 12 S.W. 924 (1890).




the Town of Unicoi from the exemption. Too, if the adjacent area is
itself incorporated, the function of supplying water to it becomes the
concern of the latter municipality; it is not within the public purposes
of one municipality to provide water to the inhabitants of another
city.
Upon these principles the water lines and limited acreage on which
the springs and creek were located are clearly exempt from taxation
by the county. As to the remaining acreage which was a part of the
watershed, the court held that the acquisition of such acreage was a
proper part of the public function. Protection of the water source,
both as to quality and quantity, requires some control over the sur-
rounding watershed. So long as this area is not used for an income-
producing or commercial purpose not a part of the water-supply
function, the property is exempt. The case suggests but does not raise
the interesting question as to how extensive these exempt watershed
holdings may be.
OFFICERS
Summary Removal from Office: In Trent v. State ex rel. Smith27 a
circuit court clerk had pleaded guilty in federal court to a charge of
violating the Mann Act and had been given a suspended sentence.
Under Code Sections 10076-10081 a summary proceeding was insti-
tuted for the removal from office of the clerk, on the ground that he
was guilty of a felony. Stripped of its procedural complications the
case holds that conviction of a felony is proper ground for removal
under the applicable statute, and that it need not be a felony in office.
The statute provides that a clerk may be removed for "a misdemeanor
in office or a felony." This phraseology, together with the fact that
"misdemeanor in office" is defined in that statute, whereas felony is not
so defined, logically leads to the interpretation made by the court.
The case gave occasion for the court to restate a well-established
rule that election to office for a definite term carries with it the im-
plied condition "during good behavior."28
A procedural point of importance arose in this case. The power of
a court to remove its clerk for legal and sufficient cause is absolute
and peremptory. Proper administration of the court requires that the
clerk not be allowed to take an appeal which by its nature will sus-
pend or vacate the trial court's judgment and thus enable the clerk
to continue in office pending final disposition of the appeal. Therefore
the clerk is not entitled to an appeal in error, or an appeal in the nature
of a writ of error, nor to a broad appeal as from a chancery decree. The
26. City of Knoxville v. Park City, 130 Tenn. 626, 172 S.W. 286 (1914).
27. 195 Tenn. 350, 259 S.W.2d 657 (1953).
28. Id. at 359.
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clerk is entitled to file the record for writ of error without super-
sedeas.-
Review of Discharge: Under the Tennessee Statute" the exclusive
method of review of the action of a city or county official or board in
ruling on the employment status of a civil service employee is by com-
mon law certiorari. However, where the city official or board conducts
no hearing, and an employee claiming civil service status is summarily
fired, there is no record to be reviewed under the common law writ.
Consequently, in such a case the statute is not applicable, and the
employee may properly bring a mandamus proceeding in the chancery
court to determine whether the city acted illegally or arbitrarily.3'
Where the court finds in favor of the employee, it can properly order
the city to reinstate him with back salary and interest.
3 2
Effect of Ouster Decree: A proceeding under the Tennessee Ouster
Law" has for its purpose the removal from office of a public official
who is guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance in office. A decree of
ouster in such a proceeding simply removes the unfaithful officer from
the term which he is serving, and does not carry with it any disqualifi-
cation to hold office for subsequent terms. Accordingly, the expiration
of the term which the officer is serving at the time of the conduct upon
which the ouster suit is based renders the cause moot, and the suit
will be dismissed, even though the officer has in the meantime been
elected to and is serving a new term in the same office.3 4
Term of Office-Holdovers in Office: The constitutional provision
with respect to the term of an elected officer is that he shall hold office
for a specified term and until the qualification of his successor.3 5 Thus
where for any reason steps are not taken to elect officers for a new
term, the old officers are authorized to continue to exercise the func-
tions and prerogatives of the office until successors are duly qualified.
However, a holdover officer has no such vested right in the office as
will give him standing to test the validity of an Act of the legislature
which purports to eliminate the office. 36
Power of Legislature to fill County Office: The new Home Rule
Amendment to the Tennessee Constitution37 will probably eventually
29. Id. at 356-57.
30. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, c. 266, §§ 1-2; Tenn. Code Ann. § 9018.1 (Williams
Supp. 1952).
31. State ex rel. Paylor v. City of Knoxville, 195 Tenn. 318, 259 S.W.2d 537
(1953).
32. Ibid.
33. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 1877-1902 (Williams 1934).
34. State ex rel. Agee v. Hassler, 264 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. 1954).
35. TmN. CONST. Art. 7, § 5.
,36. State ex rel. Turner v. Wilson, 264 S.W.2d 796 (Tenn. 1954).
37. See Hunt, Constitutional Law-1954 Tennessee Survey, supra p. 763 at
768.
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eliminate the basis for the type of suit represented by Carr v. State ex
rel. Armour.38 Armour had been elected by the County Court of
Hardeman County to be Superintendent of Schools for a four-year
term beginning January 15, 1953. Shortly thereafter when the legis-
lature convened it passed a Private Act 39 which changed the method
of election of the school superintendent by making the office subject
to popular election. The term of office was changed so as to make the
new term begin in September, 1954, and Carr was named to fill the
office until the beginning of the 1954 term. The Supreme Court sus-
tained Armour's contention that the legislature had no power to name
Carr to the office for the interim period. Although the legislature did
have power to change the method of election, and indeed to eliminate
the office altogether in the absence of contrary general law, it could
not retain the office and name one other than the incumbent during his
term to fill it until the new system could go into effect. The State
Constitution provides that "No county office created by the Legislature
shall be filled otherwise than by the people or the County Court.""0
This provision does not prohibit the legislature from naming a tem-
porary officer to act until the first regular opportunity of the local
power to elect the officer, provided a new office is being created.
41
However, where the office is already in existence and an incumbent
is serving a term to which he was elected by the then proper local
authority, Carr v. State ex rel. Armour makes it clear that the legis-
lature cannot unseat the incumbent and name a successor.
Contracts of Municipal Officer with Employer: The Tennessee
statutes dealing with public contracts expressly prohibit any officer
or other person whose duty it is to vote for, let out, overlook, or in any
manner superintendent any work or contract in which any govern-
mental unit may be interested to be directly or indirectly interested
in such contract.42 In case a person violates this statute, he forfeits
all pay and compensation therefor43 and is subject to dismissal from
office, with ineligibility to hold the same or similar office for ten
years.44 Another statute applying specially to municipal corporations
makes an officer of such corporation incapable of contracting with the
corporation for any work which is to be paid for out of the city
treasury, and provides for forfeiture of amounts paid on such contract,
and recovery therefor by the municipality upon the suit of any citizen
38. 265 S.W.2d 556 (Tenn. 1954).
39. Tenn. Private Acts 1953, c. 19.
40. Ttww. CONST. Art. 11, § 17.
41. Crewse v. Beeler, 186 Tenn. 475, 212 S.W.2d 39 (1948).
42. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1874 (Williams 1934).
43. Id. at § 1875.
44. Id. at § 1876.
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of the municipality.45 In Crass v. Walls,46 the Mayor of Oliver Springs
was a partner with his brother in an arrangement whereby the part-
nership hauled and spread crushed rock on the city streets, and gath-
ered and disposed of city garbage. It appeared that the partnership
made no profit from the operation, and that the services rendered were
in good faith, with the welfare of the town in view, and at a cost to the
city below that which anyone else would have charged. No express
contract was entered into, but the court found that the services were
rendered with the expectation of pay on both sides. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the chancellor's decree awarding recovery for the
town of one-half the amount paid to the partnership and declaring the
ex-mayor, whose term had expired, ineligible to hold the same or
similar office for ten years. The court recognized that the result is
harsh; but it quoted with approval from an earlier case4 7 that the rule
"is based on a wise purpose and principle, that is, to prevent public
officials from using their public functions and duties to subserve their
private interests. It does not matter that the service is rendered faith-
fully and inures to the benefit of the county .... "The Walls case thus
restates existing principles. One who makes such a contract cannot
recover upon it, nor can he recover on a quantum meruit, and if he has
already been paid, the city can recover the payment in full.
48
It is significant to note that the court found in the Walls case that
there was an implied contract; that is, the partnership expected to be
paid, and the city expected to pay for the services. Under the rule of
Knoxville v. Christenberry49 a city may pay its officers for benefits
received and special services rendered, provided that the services and
benefits were not rendered under a prohibited contract. In the Chris-
tenberry case a mayor spent considerable time and some of his own
money working outside the scope of his ordinary duties, performing
services for which the city could legally and properly have contracted
with third parties. The mayor could not have contracted to perform
the services for pay, nor could he have recovered in contract or quasi-
contract for the services rendered. However, the city, after receiving
the benefit of the services, chose to pay the officer for the services.
He accepted, and it was held that the city could not recover the sums
thus paid.
The distinction between the Walls and Christenberry cases is clear;
yet it would seem that Christenberry introduces an unfortunate ad-
ministrative difficulty into the picture. Walls says that a municipality
can not pay for special services rendered to it by one of its officers if
45. Id. at §§ 3497-3498.
46. 259 S.W.2d 670 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
47. Madison County v. Alexander, 116 Tenn. 685, 94 S.W. 604 (1906).
48. Savage v. Mynatt, 156 Tenn. 119, 299 S.W. 1043 (1927).
49. 147 Tenn. 286, 247 S.W. 98 (1922).
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it receives the benefits with the expectation of paying therefor. Chris-
tenberry says that a municipality can pay for services if it receives the
benefits without the expectation of paying therefor. What then of the
officer who renders special services without a contract but with the
hope that he will be paid? Assuming that absolutely nothing has been
said about compensation, but that the history of the municipality has
been that it has consistently paid its officers after receiving special
benefits from their services, Does an officer who, knowing these facts,
performs special services come under the proscribed implied-in-fact
contract of Walls, or under the permissible gratuity of Christenberry?
The officer who comes into court with something less than perfect good
faith may find himself classified with Christenberry and thus eligible to
receive or retain a gratuitous payment by the city; whereas he who
states with complete frankness that he knew he could not force the city
to pay, but hoped and expected with good reason that he would be.1 paid
may find that he is subject to the penalties of the statute. It is submit-
ted that the Supreme Court could perform a service by seizing the first
opportunity to overrule Christenberry, rather than distinguishing it on
its special facts, so that the rule, though harsh, would be absolute and
clear: "A public officer may not contract with his own governmental
unit, and if he performs special services without a contract the city
may not pay him therefor, and if it does pay him, the sums can be
recovered at the suit of any citizen of the municipality."
An important procedural point should be noted here. Appeals in
cases involving the right to hold public office are taken direct to the
Supreme Court.50 However, suits under Code Sections 1874-1876,
though they may result in dismissal from office and a declaration of
ineligibility for ten years, are held not to involve the right to hold a
public office, and appeals under these statutes are properly taken to
the Court of Appeals. So in Crass v. Walls when the original appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court it was by that court transferred to
the Court of Appeals.5 1
Policy of the Statute: Code Sections 1874-1876 were also involved in
State ex rel. Ellis v. Robbins.52 There Ellis, County Superintendent of
Schools whose term was about to expire, recommended to the County
Board of Education that he be appointed as supervising teacher of the
county schools to begin at the expiration of his tenure as superinten-
dent. Under the applicable statute 3 the superintendent was a member
of the executive committee of the board of education. Section 2323 of
the Code makes it a misdemeanor in office for a county superintendent
50. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10618 (Williams Supp. 1952).
51. Crass v. Walls, 194 Tenn. 573, 253 S.W.2d 755 (1952).
52. 263 S.W.2d 518 (Tenn. 1953).
53. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2327 (6) (Williams 1934).
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to take any other contract under the county board of education. The
Supreme Court, in a short opinion by Justice Prewitt, ruled that the
contract of employment as supervising teacher was void as against
public policy. The opinion does not make it entirely clear whether the
contract is found to come within the terms of Sections 1874-1876 and
Section 2323, or whether it is from these statutes that the court de-
termines the public policy which is offended by the contract in ques-
tion. The opinion is phrased in terms of general public policy, but at
one place the court states that "to hold that [the contract is valid] ...
would nullify the statute and defeat its purpose."
54
OFiciAL BoiDs
Liability on Bond of Holdover Officer: In Garner v. State ex rel.
Atkins,5 5 a constable while arresting plaintiff for an alleged traffic
violation committed an unjustified assault and battery upon plaintiff.
The constable upon his original election to office for a two-year term
procured a surety company to execute his official bond as surety; at
the expiration of this first term, the constable, having been reelected,
continued to serve. He made no attempt to qualify with a new bond
for the second term, and thus was in the position of holding over from
his first term, since no successor had qualified. He continued to pay
premiums on the original bond, and the surety company accepted the
payments. Under these facts the Court of Appeals held that the surety
company accepted the payments. Under these facts the Court of Ap-
peals held that the surety bond continued in force and that the surety
company was liable to plaintiff on the bond. The decision seems
clearly correct, either on the theory that an officer who is holding over
is still serving the original term for purposes of his bond; or that the
tender and acceptance of additional premiums after the time when
the original term should have expired could.be held to amount to a
renewal of the bond, and thus a re-qualification of the constable.
54. 263 S.W.2d at 519.
55. 266 S.W.2d 358 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
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